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**HUSSERL AND
HEIDEGGER
ON ART AND
ART WORKS**

9-34

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::ABSTRACT

THE PRESENT ARTICLE IS an attempt to unfold the phenomenological philosophy of Husserl and Heidegger pertaining to the literary work of art and other art works. The aim is to show the sense of phenomenology in view of the treatment of the literary work and other works of art by each thinker. Though Husserl did not pursue a theory of art, nevertheless, in his lectures, letters, and sketches published posthumously, he provided conceptual resources and suggestions about aesthetic consciousness, which many theorists have found particularly apt for literary thinking. Following Husserl's phenomenological reduction we examine the world of the literary work, not as an objective reality, but as a *Lebenswelt* (life-world), a reality as experienced by an individual subject. Heidegger's phenomenology, on the other hand, is ontological. Retaining some of Husserl's analysis of the *life-world*, Heidegger was able to see the world as most intimately related to Dasein, as always already given in Dasein's being as being-in-the-world, and thereby make it visible for others to see. After discussing *The Origin of the Work of Art* in some detail, we will present the method by which Heidegger poses the question of being, relating it to language.

Key words: Husserl, Heidegger, art, appearance, truth, being, language

POVZETEK**HUSSERL IN HEIDEGGER O UMETNOSTI IN UMETNIJAH**

Pričujoči članek predstavlja poskus razlage Husserlove in Heideggerjeve fenomenološke filozofije s stališča literarne umetnine in umetniškega dela nasploh. Namen prispevka je pokazati pomen fenomenologije v luči obravnave literarnega dela in drugih umetniških del obeh mislecev. Čeprav Husserl izrecno ni obravnaval teorije umetnosti, pa je kljub vsemu v svojih posthumno izdanih predavanjih, pismih in osnutkih zapustil pojmovne zamisli in napotke o estetski zavesti, ki jo mnogi teoretiki označujejo za posebej primereno, ko je govora o literarnem mišljenju. Sledeč Husserlovi fenomenološki redukciji bomo svet literarnega dela preučevali ne kot objektivno realnost, temveč kot *Lebenswelt* (življenjski svet), kot realnost, kakor jo doživlja posamezni subjekt. Po drugi strani pa bo izpeljava Heideggerjeve fenomenologije ontološka. Ne povsem zanemarjajoč Husserlove analize življenjskega sveta je bil Heidegger sposoben videti svet kot najintimnejše povezanega s tubitjo (Dasein), kot vselej že danega v biti tubiti kot biti-v-svetu, in ga na ta način napraviti vidnega drugim. Po podrobni obravnavi Izvora umetniškega dela bom predstavil tudi metodo, s katero Heidegger, nanašajoč se na jezik, zastavi vprašanje biti.

The theme of this article is the position and characterization pertaining to art and art works in the phenomenological philosophy of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger. The aim is to show the sense of phenomenology in view of the treatment of the literary work and other works of art by each thinker. Though within phenomenology the views between the two philosophers differ significantly, however, each of them influenced different approaches to art which have been much valuable for its study.

Although Husserl only touched upon aesthetic and artistic issues in a few texts and sketches, however, he provided significant conceptual and methodological resources about aesthetic and artistic consciousness, which can be further analyzed and developed on its own. First of all, we should take into account the following: (i) the problem of aesthetic attitude (for which phantasy is not the most crucial issue, but rather an attitude towards that which is important in an aesthetic aspect; (ii) the question of the representation as in the case of paintings, hence the subject matter of an object that is represented as an appearance and (iii) the question of the relationship between the original and the reproduction of a picture: in this particular group belongs the creative activity of the artist as a product of an objectifying fiction.

It is often pointed out that Husserl's texts and seminars on the problem of aesthetics based on his writings which are available to us, served as foundation to the aesthetic research work of Nicolai Hartmann and Roman Ingarden. Moreover, it may be claimed that most of the problems that we still encounter within the phenomenological aesthetics have their origin in Husserl's work. It would not be without reason to think that not only Hartmann and Ingarden, but also the work of Heidegger, Scheler, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, Levinas, Ricoeur, Derrida (to name just a few), can hardly be understood without an insight into Husserl's writings. If Ingarden or Heidegger declared that they had not been able to help in reviewing and arranging the complete work of Husserl for publication, it does not mean that they had not had access to Husserl's work and manuscripts, and that they did not rely on them in their works. Heidegger's analysis of time may be said to be under considerable influence of Husserl's own seminars on the concept of time (which Heidegger himself prepared for publication), though it is quite another thing that both of them owe their ideas to Aristotle. On the other hand, Ingarden's example about the way in which he turned Husserl's solutions into his own "original ideas" is far more dramatic and can be widely examined, not to mention Merleau-Ponty's huge indebtedness to Husserl whose phenomenology exercises a particular influence over Merleau-Ponty's argument in *Phenomenology of Perception*. It may therefore be claimed that each of Husserl's followers embarked on his path in order to build their own methods of philosophy, because in Husserl they saw open questions that referred to the problem of the *world*.

 ::I

In phenomenology Husserl sought to provide a descriptive analysis of the objective world as it appears to the subject. Phenomenology according to him is a science of the pure description of essences, just as mathematics is, labeling his phenomenology as a *phenomenological transcendental philosophy*. With this he had in mind a new type of philosophy, one fundamental philosophical science, i.e. a pure phenomenology that would allow philosophy to be a rigorous science. He taught us that philosophy is a process in which we understand our knowledge of being, and came to the idea of phenomenology as a science which would encompass the whole reality. As noted by Brian Elliott:

[I]n *Logical Investigations* Husserl inaugurates phenomenology not so much as the ‘science of sciences’ announced in the *Prolegomena* but rather as a type of ‘restricted ontology’, that is, an elucidation of things insofar as they are “*of*” or “*for*” consciousness, that is, insofar as they give themselves to consciousness as phenomena.”¹

For Husserl, the study of appearances or phenomena (*noemata*) is made possible by the goal of studying consciousness. Instead of metaphysical questions, phenomenology describes *phenomena*, in the Greek sense of the term, as the appearance of things. According to Plato, knowledge itself begins with appearances², therefore Husserl claims that we need to go back to the things themselves, that is, to analyze that which manifests itself as such and actually appears, rather than deal with empty talk or undifferentiated generality. If it is not to remain empty talk or philosophical invention, this knowledge must follow a methodical research of differentiated self-evidences by considering the world purely as meant without falling into philosophical or ontological claims. Therefore this procedure implies a *methodological idealism* rather than a *doctrinal idealism*. For Husserl, “phenomenological explication does nothing *but explicate the sense this world has for us all, prior to any philosophizing – a sense which philosophy can uncover but never alter.*” (Carr, 1974: 38) Phenomenology is a new *way of looking at things* yet taking the whole world as its subject matter.³ Subjectivity depends on the world; in fact it demands the world. The

¹ Elliott, B. (2005): *Phenomenology and Imagination in Husserl and Heidegger*. New York: Routledge, p. 20.

² Jose Ortega y Gasset argues that appearances in themselves do not exist, and the relationships that serve as principle do not exist either. “What *is*, the truth lies in the actual adequation between principle and problem, between hypothesis and appearances.” Gasset further contends that if the *consciousness* of which idealism spoke were really something, it would precisely be *weltsetzend* (that which posits the world), the immediate encounter with reality. This is why it is a self-contradictory concept, since for idealism consciousness means precisely the *unreality* of the world it posits and encounters. By suspending the executive powers of *consciousness*, its *weltsetzung*, writes Gasset – “the reality of its *content*,” phenomenology destroys its fundamental character. *Consciousness* is precisely what cannot be suspended, it is irrevocable. This is why it is reality and *not* consciousness. Ortega y Gasset, J. (1975): *Phenomenology and Art*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc. pp. 66, 89.

³ For Jan Patočka phenomenology is thus “a purely intuitive study of noetico-noematic structures. Its field is all reality as constituted in subjective lived-experience and the study of its constitution: either of constitution as a

existence of the world for us is what phenomenology wants to explain, and in this world there is a *worlding* that is not *given* to us but which must be unfolded, revealed, discovered in a deeper mode. The unfolding and disclosing of *this worlding of the world* and the things in the world is irreducible to the objective aspect of the world. Thus our natural attitude is transformed by what Husserl calls *epoché*. The *epoché* is necessary because we want to understand the being-there, for us, of the world and its entities.⁴ Put differently, the question concerns not only the experience of individual things in the world, but the experience of the world and everything it constitutes. According to Jan Patočka, *epoché* is “nothing other than the discovery of the freedom of the subject which is manifested in all transcendence, most of all in temporal, presentational transcendence – in our living in principle in horizons which first bestow full meaning on the present and that, in the words of the thinker, we are beings of the far reaches.” (Patočka, 1996:135)

Husserl distinguishes consciousness⁵ from the world *out there*. This interrelationship of subject and object constitutes consciousness itself. Thus, there can be no subject without an object, nor can there be an object without a subject to apprehend it. Consciousness is always consciousness of something that is directed somewhere, through intentionality. The concept of intentionality is at the core of Husserl’s phenomenology. According to him, experiences are characterized by being conscious *of* something, which means that they are all directed toward an object. This is what we would call *intentionality*. Every form of consciousness, say when we think, judge, fantasize, love, all these forms are characterized by their intending objects and can be properly analyzed only through their intended objects. Husserl contended that the essence of an object may be known through the process of *free or imaginative variation*. He takes up this notion in order to clarify the essential form of intentionality. The method of imaginative or free variation leads to eidetic intuition, the *eidōs* (essence) of the object in question. The object known through *free variation* is not to be identified with the actual object, and does not occur in isolation, but belongs to various forms of intentionality, as we try to determine the essence of perception, memory, judging, etc. In other words, the point is not to fix the actuality of the object, but to render its actuality within the temporal horizon of the object as a unity of its own possibilities. Husserl claims that the representa-

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 study of the *foundation*, primarily one-sided, of lived-experiences and their layering and structuring, or a genetic constitution, a study of their essential temporal structure.” Patočka, J. (1996): *An Introduction to Husserl’s Phenomenology*. Chicago: Open Court Publishing Company, p. 103.

⁴ Soren Overgaard draws parallels between Husserl’s *epoché* and Heidegger’s description of *anxiety*. Overgaard, S. (2004): *Husserl and Heidegger on Being in the World*. Kluwer Academic Publishers, p. 27.

⁵ Jeff Mitscherling remarks: “According to Husserl, there are three kinds of perception: external, internal, and immanent. External perception has as its objects the ‘things’ of the external, ‘real’ world; the study of such objects is the proper domain of the physical sciences. Internal perception has as its objects the subjective states of the psychic subject; the study of these objects is the proper domain of psychology. Immanent perception has as its objects the phenomena of consciousness itself; the study of these objects is the proper domain of phenomenology.” Mitscherling, J. (1997): *Roman Ingarden’s Ontology and Aesthetics*. University of Ottawa Press, p. 81.

tion of any object that is interpreted must first be perceived. In *Hua19/437* (the modified translation of Dan Zahavi that we will use below), we find the following passage:

A painting is only a likeness for a likeness-constituting consciousness, whose imaginative apperception, basing itself on a perception, first gives to its primary, perceptually apparent object the status and meaning of an image. Since the interpretation of anything as an image presupposes an object intentionally given to consciousness, we should plainly have a *regressus in infinitum* were we all again to let this latter object be constituted through an image, or to speak seriously of a ‘perceptual image’ immanent in a simple perception, *by way of which* it refers to the ‘thing itself’.⁶

Then, what is the meaning of a phenomenon in a work of art? It could be said that a “real object” does not seem to have a higher status of being than an object of art does, but its phenomenon has its own character of being. In the case of the painting, we might therefore maintain that it is presented to us with the appearance of something or, in other words, what it is that emerges into appearance and how such an appearance happens. The landscape comes to appearance through the painting. The painting is therefore a painting by reason of our letting the landscape be seen. According to Husserl, objects appear and are perceived, but they are not experienced. The *appearance* of an object is constituted in the interaction between sensations and interpretation. Intentionality therefore consists of the interpretation of something *as* something. As Husserl puts it: “Objects are first *constituted* as being, what they are for us, and as what they count as for us, in varying forms of objective intention.” (Zahavi, 2003:27)

Since phenomena as possibilities can be perceived adequately through free variation, they can be given only through *phantasy*. Thus, Husserl argues that art is of particular significance for the practice of phantasy. According to Husserl, poetry “towers high above the products of our phantasy and, in addition, when apprehended understandingly, become converted into perfectly clear phantasies with particular ease owing to the suggestive power exerted by artistic means of presentation.” (Husserl, 1983: 160) In this respect, concludes Husserl, “feigning [fiktion] makes up the vital element of phenomenology as of every eidetic science, that feigning is the source from which cognition of *eternal truths* is fed.” (ibid.:160) The cognition of essence is heightened both by means of phantasy and its inherent free variations. *Essence* thus remains the invariable factor through all variations. Husserl admits that the phantasy played in a work of art is more accessible to us than our own ordinary phantasy. Art comes into being by transferring phantasy into reality, the artist playing with the real on the other side of the actual. What lays to the fore is the work of art, i.e. the thing itself, em-

⁶ Zahavi, D. (2003): *Husserl’s Phenomenology*. Stanford/ California: Stanford University Press, pp. 18–19.

phasizing the study of the objective, the work of art itself rather than the artist. This standpoint is a result of Husserl's long preoccupation with the study of the ideal objects which he terms *the world of a priori* i.e. the perception of a possible object depending on a fixed description. Thus, Husserl considers primarily the question of the meaning of *object* or an *image-object* (*Bildobjekt*) within the realm of phantasy, i.e. what is brought to light here is not the relevance of how a phenomenon is observed through perception (observation of the external), but rather what lingers in our phantasy (inner seeing). The external appearance of an object is confronted by the internal presentation (the lingering in the phantasy).

Image consciousness is a unique form of intentionality: 'Without an image, there is no fine art, writes Husserl, "and the image must be *clearly* set apart from reality, that is, set apart in a purely intuitive way, without any assistance from indirect thoughts." (Husserl, 2005: 44). What an image represents, however, is immanent to the image. Aesthetic appearances "express from within" (ibid: 169) and constitute an ideal, "suspended" world. "Art truly offers us an infinite wealth of perceptual fictions (feigning)", he observes, "specifically, of purely perceptual fictions and of purely reproductive fictions as well." (ibid.: 620). "The peculiar quality of phantasy", claims Husserl "is its self-will. And so ideally it distinguishes itself by its absolute arbitrariness." (Husserl, 1980: 535) For *phantasy*, as he contends, "is a modification of consciousness that manifests itself – as a consciousness of nonactuality since actuality "means as much as taking stands, nonactuality is nothing but an "analogue of pure phantasy (and fixes a concept of imagination, insofar as pure imagination expresses the prevention of actuality)" (Iser, 1993: 199). "Accordingly, descriptive statements, judgments about the characters, about their expected development, have a kind of objective truth, even though they refer to fictions." (Husserl, 2005: 621). Yet we must be careful to note that imagination (pictorial consciousness) and phantasy are not the same thing, although they both imply a consciousness of something absent. As Husserl himself explicates: "In pictorial consciousness I intend something via something else. This *representative* function is not a part of phantasy. If I imagine a dancing faun, this faun is not taken to be a representation of a real faun. On the contrary we are dealing with an intentional object that is not taken to be real, but that merely appears *as if* it were real." (Gallagher, Zahavi, 2008: 104)

The *world* of a literary work is not an objective reality, but a *Lebenswelt* (life-world), a reality as experienced by an individual subject. But the *natural attitude* that we face in our daily experience should be suspended if we are to reveal those structures of consciousness which underlie our day-to-day existence.⁷ Thus, Husserl proposes another level of reflection called *phenomenological reduction*. The phenomenological reduction *brackets* the *natural attitude* by leaving it intact. Instead of assuming that the world exists for us in the ways in does, we confront the world *as-*

⁷ Søren Overgaard observes: "The crucial difference between Heidegger's and Husserl's description of that which is experienced in the natural attitude, or everyday life, is thus that unlike his mentor, Heidegger describes everyday Dasein from a standpoint "outside" everydayness." (ibid.: 21)

meant, as intended by the structures of consciousness (Makaryk, 1993:140). Considering his *phenomenology of evidence*, Husserl writes:

Phenomenology...encompasses the whole natural world and all of the ideal worlds which it excludes: phenomenology encompasses them as the “world sense” by virtue of the sets of eidetic laws connecting any object-sense and noema whatever with the closed system of noeses, and specifically by virtue of the eidetic concatenations of rational positing the correlate of which is the “actual object” which, thus, on its side, always exhibits the index for the whole determined system of teleologically unifying fashionings of consciousness. (Ideas, 1983: 347–48)

A specific kind of consciousness, the consciousness of the picture object which enables and mediates the depicting, is an example for the neutrality modification of perception. The depicting world of fiction is present to us neither as existing nor as non-existing, but as *quasi-existing* in the neutrality modification of being. Yet, what if Plato’s theory of mimesis on art being *twice removed from reality* were true? Then the entire phenomenology would be misconstrued: instead, we think that a work of fiction presents the world as appearance: the events, characters, places are not unreal, but *irreal* which signifies the possibility of that fact or event. According to Maurice Natanson “irrealization is not a ‘removal’ from reality but rather an abstention from claiming the ordinary as real, an abstention which is under the control of a methodologically willed procedure.” (Natanson, 1998: 28) The appearance of the real thing presented in fiction does not disappear while reading, but is *bracketed*. Let us take as an example the opening paragraph of Charles Dickens’ *The Pickwick Papers*:

That punctual servant of all work, the sun, had just risen and begun to strike a light on the morning of the thirteenth of May, one thousand eight hundred and twenty-seven, when Mr. Samuel Pickwick burst like another sun from his slumbers, threw open his chamber window, and looked out upon the world beneath. Goswell Street was at his feet, Goswell Street extended on his left; and the opposite side of Goswell Street was over the way.

The version of the world as presented to us here in Dickens’ novel is *bracketed* in its real givenness, it is set in *epoché*. “The bracketing imposes an *as-if*”, would write Iser, “a bracketing that creates the all-important condition for the totality to be conceived. (Iser, 1993: 90) We experience London’s Goswell Street on a sunny day in 1827 to be nothing but an appearance. One knows that the sun exists beyond doubt, the same as London and Goswell Street exist in the real world, too, but their reality is abrogated in the novel. Since the question concerning their reality does not stand under any compulsion, and insofar as it is not a condition for understanding a work of fiction, they need nothing besides themselves to exist. *Art works are appearances in themselves*, to follow Figal’s formulation. Thus, as an appearance of the possible, the events in a work of fiction become transparent as such. We might also

add that through phantasy we can make present something which itself is not. Dorian Cairns observes:

The act of phantasing is itself not a *fictum*, but a real event, part of the real flux of consciousness. Its real positing however is a positing as “fiction.” In positing the “fictive object,” the phantasing act fictively posits a positing of the act as real. In other words, the full correlate of the phantasing act is, not the phantasied object alone, but the phantasied object as intended in a (phantasied) act. The phantasied act is posited, in the phantasing act, as belonging to the phantasied stream of consciousness of a phantasied ego.⁸

Through that which Husserl calls the *reiterable modification of phantasy* or the *reiterability* in phantasy, we can also generate new phantasies *abiding in* phantasies. These fictive presentations are not present as real, but only seemingly present as such, or quasi-existing in the neutrality modification of being. The depicting picture-object of the Goswell Street in Dickens’ fictive world, is not depicted by thetic modality, but by a neutrality modification which is given in the sense of a *just as if* being. Dickens’ depiction of objects allows us to see them as seemingly-real objects, or to see them in their quasi-existence. The *experience world* is made of an infinite system of present experiences which are expressed within the horizon created by experience, whereas a *phantasy world* is a totally free world; a fantasied thing lives in the phantasy world as a quasi-world: its indefinite horizon cannot be expressed by the analyzing of experience.

A literary work of art can be understood as a set of quasi-statements, a view later presented by Roman Ingarden in his research on the stratification of the work of art. But it is quite important to see the way in which Husserl approaches this problem: if poetry is a set of asserting statements, then it is necessary to look for its origins in Aristotle. In chapter 9 of his *Poetics*, Aristotle establishes the difference between poetry and history. He writes: “History tells what has happened, poetry what is such that it could happen. That’s why poetry is more philosophical and more serious than is history; for poetry tells more of the universal, history of the particulars.” (51b3 – 8) By *what is such that it could happen*, Aristotle means *what is likely, what is possible* (eikos). Therefore, a work of fiction offers appearances, appearances of the possible. “(Poetry) does not detach itself from the factual by grasping this universally in concepts,” to cite Figal, “but it also does not hold itself to the particulars of a factual givenness. It stands in the middle by being more general than the depiction of what has happened and yet more concrete than any general determination.” (Figal, 2015: 74)

A poem, according to Husserl, is an *objective idea* which is ideally materialized in the act of reading. (Hua, XXIII/543) This objectified idea made inter-subjectively accessible to us by the poet, is a work. In the same text Husserl ascribes the creation

⁸ Cairns, D. (2013): *The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl*. Springer, p. 48.

of a poem to the power of phantasy in the following way: in any *phantasy world* there is a fantasized reality, and secondly, in any analyzing of the poem's nature, one must analyze first of all the ground of its reception (origin). Husserl thus suggests that the origin of a poem is related to the poet, whose origin (the poet's) is thereafter fused with the work he creates, in a particular moment of his existence. Yet Husserl is mindful in not going further to rendering the fictive into an existing structure, for this would lead him to opening the ontological aspect of an artwork, an aspect that he avoided paying attention to. Poetry and the poetic should not be mystified by metaphysical approaches, but rather should be approached by the material domain of research that is made possible precisely by phenomenological philosophy which from the beginning had been focused on the research of subjectivity i.e. giving prominence to the essential ways in which a subject is manifested: to make prominent phantasy, as the most conspicuous feature that is present in the creation of a poetic work. Günter Figal observes:

Art, and especially poetry, is capable of mediating “clear phantasies”, because it uses “suggestive means of presentation”. The artistic and especially the poetic phantasies are thus clear *on the basis of their presentation*; that is because they have been lifted out of consciousness' continuous process of variation and become determined. Only thus, through the fixation in the artwork, can the “plentitude of the individual traits” and “the completeness of motivation”; that is, the coherent connection of phantasized possibilities, be recognized. (Figal, 2015: 70–71)

Of similar importance is Husserl's discussion of reality as represented on stage: all objects, characters, things that we happen to see in a play being staged, have the character of an *as-if*, i.e. everything that appears there is not a representation of itself, but a presentation of what is not there and therefore given to us more directly at the moment of our watching the play. The audience, throughout the duration of the play experiences an illusory image of the world, for this is precisely what drama does: it enables the world to play its play within it. Likewise, the objects that are present on the stage (room, chairs, tables, curtains etc.) are all fictional, i.e. they can be usable for the characters who themselves are fictions, so the phantasy world that we as audience perceive, does not mirror reality, but is cognized as an *as-if* reality. The perceived phantasy is made possible on the ground of reality, and the audience while perceiving one reality, experiences quite another. This reality in other words is only a presumption of the fictional, existing only in the audience's consciousness that sees it artistically, i.e. that is able to see beyond reality, to penetrate the reality molded by actors during the performance of the play. This representation (the world of make-believe) appears to us as an illusion of quite a different nature: we accept the theatrical illusion as something not fused with reality, but rather as a representation of reality, which might be conditionally called an image of reality. Therefore it may be said that there are two realities which are manifested in the consciousness of audience: in the first, the audience despite experiencing the perfor-

mance on the ground of illusion, remains conscious throughout the duration of the play. In the second, the audience (having abandoned the ground of reality which is founded in experience) begins perceiving the phantasy world by actively judging, liking, fearing, suffering the actions that take place on the play in an *as if* mode, i.e. in a mode of phantasy, undergoing thus not so much a *real experience*, but rather an artistic experience. This is how Milan Uzelac, succinctly puts it:

All poetic statements are *as if statements* or, as one may put it in accordance with Aristotle's conception of art: all literary statements are neutral with regard to being. This neutrality is what makes it possible for us to enjoy a work of art at all, because it allows us to enjoy in the *representation* of an object and not the object represented. ... It is therefore hardly accidental that the essence of fiction with all its modes of reality always "stands" before our eyes as a live present moment; in this way it is confirmed that reality (as we see it, as "real reality") is not a possibility, and possibility is not reality, so any mention of foundations and foundation laying in such a context should be taken conditionally: it is primarily a matter of "neutralization" where the building of a fictional world nullifies the perception of the real world.⁹

Since the fictional (while we are in the theater) is represented in the thing itself (i.e. in its own perceptive manifestation), therefore what we do perceive is fiction. If for Husserl the aim of art is the *setting-to-work* (i.e. *the representation* of an object in its givenness), for Martin Heidegger, as we will see in the second part, the aim of art is *setting-truth-to-work* (i.e. *the object represented* or the truth of being as such).

From what has been discussed above it may be claimed that both experience and phantasy form a unity of consciousness as a ground upon which the world of art abides. The audience or reader renders the work of art into a *quasi-experience*, and as real beings we cannot abide only in fiction but abide in a given reality (in an ontological sense), yet "it is precisely the awareness of being", as Uzelac observes, "that makes possible life in the world of fiction and its acceptance as an as-if world." (ibid.: 23)

::II

In his *Ideas* Husserl refers to the natural attitude as *the world out there*. Heidegger takes up this *world out there* from Husserl as *being-in-the-world* and understands it as being open to the openness of Being. (Vycinas, 1969: 156) This open attitude enables things to be objects of accordance. Openness makes possible an open attitude, and as such an open attitude enables a thing to become an object, and as Vycinas explicates, of all beings only man with his open attitude to beings makes possible

⁹ Uzelac, M. (1998): "Art and Phenomenology in Edmund Husserl." In: *Axiomathes*, Nos. 1-2, p. 22.

an accordance or discordance with these objects. And if truth of a statement is made possible by the open attitude, then this open attitude (which, according to Heidegger, alone makes *correctness* possible), cannot be regarded as the essence of truth if it is taken to mean simply that truth be located in the mind or in our subjective cognitive powers only. Rather, Heidegger argues, our open attitude is ontologically prior to our cognitive faculties. Thus, the open attitude (this truth which is more basic than correctness) is the standing in the openness of Being. The philosophy of Martin Heidegger (1889 – 1976) is therefore a response to Husserl. Husserl's project of phenomenology is a continuous and profound negotiation with Kant's epistemology, and what Heidegger opposes is Husserl's subjectivism and anthropocentricity. According to Husserl, phenomenology is scientific, rationalist, idealist, thus he aims for a philosophy founded on a description of consciousness, while for Heidegger phenomenology is a method that emerges from *attunement* (*Befindlichkeit*). For Husserl, the ontological¹⁰ study of *Dasein* or human being, could not possibly be science, because, science according to him, must begin with the bracketing of reality, therefore the studying of human being as existent would turn science into some sort of anthropology; whereas for Heidegger the study of human being is not to be thought as a study of the psyche or psychology, for being is more than consciousness or mind, and it is precisely with this move that Heidegger aligns his thinking with art and poetry rather than with the scientific paradigm presented by Husserl.¹¹

Following the Kantian *Ding-an-sich* concept, Husserl thinks that that which does not appear does not belong in the phenomenological philosophy, thus, it has nothing to say about Being, because Being does not appear. Heidegger, on the other hand, holds that Being always appears and we always have its knowledge because we belong

¹⁰ Concerning the ontological position between Husserl and Heidegger, Dan Zahavi provides the following elucidation:

“It is occasionally claimed that Husserl—in contrast to later phenomenologists, such as Heidegger—did not deal with ontological questions. At first this claim seems absurd, but it cannot simply be refuted by appeal to the quotations already given, since a comparison of Husserl and Heidegger will show that they do not understand the same when speaking of ontology. When Husserl speaks of ontology he is normally referring to either formal or material ontology, that is, to theories concerned with the properties of objects, whereas Heidegger typically understands the *true fundamental-ontological* question as a question pertaining to the Being of beings: What is it that conditions that something *is*, what is the condition of possibility of beings? Since Heidegger himself emphasizes that ontology is only possible as phenomenology (Heidegger 1986, 35), it seems permissible, however, to reformulate his central question into the following: What is the condition of possibility for appearance and manifestation? If the question is reformulated in this way, it is clear that Heidegger's fundamental-ontological question and Husserl's transcendental-phenomenological question are not that far apart (this is even clearer if one takes Husserl's analysis of temporality into consideration). But of course, this does not imply that their answers to the question are identical.” (Zahavi, *ibid.*: 152–3)

¹¹ Brian Elliott puts it thus: “Though Heidegger often insists on the Kantian notion of recognizing essential limits to human understanding in an apparent opposition to German Idealism, his elevation of imagination above reason in his reading of Kant follows the well-established pattern of idealist critiques of Kant in Schelling, Fichte, Hegel and Schiller. The motif of the limit in Heidegger signifies not the confines of knowledge, but rather the finitude or mortality of concrete human existence.” (Elliott, *ibid.*: 2)

to Being ourselves, and by reason of this we know phenomena or things, for we always have a pre-ontological understanding of Being. Unlike Husserl who affirms that all knowledge begins, endures and ends in experience, Heidegger turns to concrete reality, in the sense of transcendence to Being. This transcendence to Being which consists of worldly realities (the fourfold), stands for the most important philosophy of the world. The fourfold (earth, sky, mortals, and divinities) belong to the world and can be *experienced* (= seen), because they are true, though not necessarily provable. And it is with this move that Heidegger breaks away from Husserl. The theme of phenomenology, therefore, is not a philosophy disclosing the essences in reality, but rather the phenomenon which primarily does not make itself manifest and which, when compared to what makes itself manifest, remains concealed and nevertheless belongs to what primarily makes itself manifest. In this respect, it belongs to the phenomenon in the sense of constituting its meaning. This phenomenon is what Heidegger calls Being, and phenomenology basically is possible as ontology.

Heidegger's reflection on the literary work of art (and arts in general), is strictly speaking, unintelligible without a proper understanding of fundamental ontology. His ontology is fundamental, not only because it poses the question the meaning of Being, but also in that it seeks to rethink Greek ontology *more originally* than the Greeks themselves. In his first comprehensive work *Being and Time* (*Sein und Zeit*, 1927), Heidegger sets out to define the question of the meaning of Being itself. As noted by Janko Lozar: "If Husserl stopped at the unquestionable, self-evident (extra-temporal) Being of consciousness, Heidegger digs deeper only to discover that the Being of *Dasein* is not eternal, ever-present, but rather finite and mortal." (Lozar, 2008: 125) Heidegger clarifies that the Greek understanding (experience) of a being was as a *phenomenon*, as appearing or what is made manifest from itself. The aim is to renew the forgotten question of the meaning of being, as the foundation for *ontology*.¹² Richard Capobianco remarks:

For Heidegger, *Sein* had been largely "forgotten" in the turn to *Sinn*, and this made raising anew the *Seinsfrage* so important and even urgent. To overcome this preoccupation with the noetic in modern and contemporary philosophy (Husserl's 'phenomenology' included), he was resolved to bring back into view, by way of retrieval of ancient Greek experience, thinking, and poetizing, "the manifestation of Being" (*die Offenbarkeit des Seins*) or "the truth of Being" (*die Wahrheit des Seins*). Being as *physis* as *aletheia*. (Capobianco, 2014: 4)

¹² "[c]onversely, it is only through phenomenology that the ontology corresponding to it established on a secure basis and held on an orderly course in its treatment of problems. When we look at consciousness of... the "of-which", i.e., the character of a being as such insofar as it is an object, also becomes visible, and it is only in this manner that it becomes visible. The characteristics of objects in the respective regions of being are what is at issue in the ontologies. This is what they come to. Precisely not being as such i.e. *be-ing* which is free of objects. Phenomenology in the narrow sense as a phenomenology of constitution. Phenomenology in the wide sense as something which includes ontology." Heidegger, M. (1999): *Ontology – The Hermeneutics of Facticity*. Indiana University Press, p. 2.

According to Daniel Dahlstrom, Heidegger employs the term *Dasein* to designate the particular being with an understanding of being or, equivalently, the particular being who exists as a *clearing* for the *disclosure* of various manners of being, including its own.¹³ Man is a being that is *thrown* among other beings in such a way that the beings have been constantly manifested themselves to him, in their Being. But it must be clarified that this comprehension of Being does not comprise only its own Being, but the Being of all other beings. This manner of men's Being is called existence. Thus, existence is the being of beings that stands open for the openness of being in which they stand. Heidegger reserves the terms *existence* and *existentia*¹⁴ for *Dasein*'s manner of being.

Retaining some of Husserl's analysis of the *life-world*, Heidegger's *world* is not a feature of objects, but rather as most intimately related to *Dasein*, as always already given in *Dasein*'s being as being-in-the-world. This leads to the account of *authenticity* and *inauthenticity* introduced by Kierkegaard, but revised by Heidegger in terms of an analytic of *Dasein*. Heidegger is criticized by fellow-thinkers like Emmanuel Levinas for regarding *the other* as a threat¹⁵ to, rather than a condition of authenticity.¹⁶

Whereas according to Husserl, in his analysis of intersubjectivity, the experience of the Other is an experience of the Other in its bodily appearance, which must be understood in terms of a relation between incarnated subjects. For Husserl the experience of the body constitutes the norm for all the other experiences. I cannot have an actual experience of the Other as I have access to my own consciousness, because in such a case, as Husserl puts it "the Other would have ceased being an Other and instead have become a part of myself." (Zahavi, 2003: 114) For Sartre, on the other hand, the relation between Self and Other is always involved and understood in a situation:

¹³ Dahlstrom, D. (2012): "Martin Heidegger." In: Luft, S. in Overgaard, S. (Eds.): *The Routledge Companion to Phenomenology*. New York: Routledge, p. 53.

¹⁴ "Heidegger terminologically distinguishes between "*existentiell*" meaning that which pertains to existence in its concrete singularity and "*existentia*" signifying what essentially characterizes existence as such. An analogous distinction is in play in Heidegger's differentiation of the *ontic* (singular beings) and the *ontological* (a region of being or beings as a whole)" (Elliott, *ibid.*: 145)

¹⁵ According to Sartre's theory of being-for-others, consciousness experiences a fundamental apodictic certainty of the ontological "sameness" of the Other. Only in response to his threatening "look" does consciousness attempt to reduce the Other to the status of a thing. It might be said, therefore, that the Other is first of all a "you" and only secondly a "s/he". Ellis, R.R. (1991): "Phenomenological Ontology and Second Person Narrative: The Case of Butor and Fuentes" In: Kronegger, M. (Ed.) (1991): *Phenomenology and Aesthetics*. Kluwer Academic Publishers, p. 246.

¹⁶ Tomo Virk carefully observes on Levinas's *metaethics*: [f]or Levinas, ethics holds a priority over ontology and epistemology, because according to him, prior to all knowledge or cognition, even cognition of being, there is the ethical responsibility that demands our response to the call or appeal of the other. This ethical responsibility must not be understood primarily in terms of ethical agency, but rather in terms of our pre-conceptual, pre-logical, and pre-ontological openness to the other. Virk, T. (2011): "The Literary and Ethics." In: Schmeling M. in Backe, H-J. (Eds.): *From Ritual to Romance and Beyond: Comparative Literature and Comparative Religious Studies*. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, p. 310.

For us, man is defined first of all as a being “in a situation.” That means that he forms a synthetic whole with his situation – biological, economic, political, cultural, etc. He cannot be distinguished from his situation, for it forms him and decides his possibilities; but, inversely, it is he who gives it meaning by making his choices within it and by it. To be in a situation, as we see it, is *to choose oneself* in a situation, and men differ from one another in their situations and also in the choices they themselves make of themselves. What men have in common is not a “nature” but a condition, that is, an ensemble of limits and restrictions. The inevitability of death, the necessity of working for a living, of living in a world already inhabited by other men. Fundamentally this condition is nothing more than the basic human situation, or, if you prefer, the ensemble of abstract characteristics common to all situations.¹⁷

An important problem that occupies a significant place in Heidegger’s ontological thought is the problem of language (*speech*). Language and the question of its essence are closely related to the question of the essence of the human being. The conception of language becomes a benchmark of how originary and vast the question of the human essence is. Yet both questions of essence are closely connected to the question of the essence of truth. Language, as the *there* of the openness of Being is the articulation of Dasein as being-in-the-world. By being-in-the-world we have an attunement-like understanding of our *world*. Our being-in-the-world, the openness of Being, is made manifest to us in our *thrownness*. Language (speech) as the articulation of that which *is*, primarily is the language of Being, and not of human speech. According to Heidegger, humans speak by way of language, or rendering it literally, *from out of* language. Thus, language is not merely a means of communication, but that which brings the world to be. By listening to language, we speak. In other words, language draws beings into their being; it brings them into presence, that is to say, the world is disclosed or opened up to us through language. Being constantly comes to language, nevertheless it (Being) still needs human being to utter its words into human saying. In this way, human being brings Being into his saying in its openness. Being dwells in the openness of the human saying. *Language is the house of Being*, writes Heidegger, *in its home human beings dwell* – since language brings a being as being into openness.¹⁸

¹⁷ Natanson, M. (1962): “Jean-Paul Sartre’s Philosophy of Freedom” In: Natanson, M. (Ed.): *Literature, Philosophy, and the Social Sciences: Essays in Existentialism and Phenomenology*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, p. 67.

¹⁸ Terry Eagleton argues that “In this sense of language as a quasi-objective event, prior to all particular individuals, Heidegger’s thinking closely parallels the theories of structuralism.” From a Structuralist point of view, human existence for Heidegger is made up of language. Eagleton, T. (2008): *Literary Theory: An Introduction*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, p. 55.

I am grateful to Professor Tomo Virk for having drawn my attention with regard to this structuralist standpoint and/or to Terry Eagleton’s paralleling Heidegger’s formulation to the theories of Structuralism. Professor Virk has made it clear to me that “even though the comparison holds in some respect, nevertheless it could be deceptive, (because) Heidegger probably wouldn’t say as structuralists and post-structuralists would – that “human existence

Language shapes our understanding of ourselves and the world prior to our speaking it. Thus, all things come into being through language. Put it differently, language speaks to us before we are speaking; it is language that speaks. But how can language itself speak? Heidegger writes:

Language speaks. Language first of all and inherently obeys the essential nature of speaking: it says. Language speaks by saying, this is, by showing. What it says wells up from the formerly spoken and so far still unspoken Saying which pervades the design (Aufriß) of language (Sprachwesen). Language speaks in that it, as showing, reaching into all regions of presences, summons from them whatever is present to appear and to fade.¹⁹

The *Wesen*²⁰ *der Sprache* (the essence of language) is the *saying* (=legein) as showing and making appear (Sage-Zeige). Saying is not to be understood as sound-language, but primarily as that which stands out in the openness of Being, and by letting that-which-is lie the way it is, we bring it into appearance. As Heidegger puts it: “Saying, if we listen to it, is what allows us to reach the speaking of language.” We belong within its saying. The thing that we are listening or *the originary language* (as

.....
is made up of language”. He rather says: ‘Language is the House of Being; in its home human beings dwell.’ This formulation is better also for the reason that Heidegger’s “language” is not at all the same as post-structuralists’ language. In Slovene, we translate Heidegger’s “language” as “talk” or “speaking”, because for Heidegger “Die Sprache spricht” (The language speaks) – this names the mode of the language, its essence. It is not a cold structure or a fleeting signifying chain, on the contrary!”

Further, the Lacanian interpreter and philosopher Slavoj Žižek argues that language violently imposes *being* to think that he is *thrown*. Violence here is to be understood in the sense of not being in continuity with reality, i.e. it twists and throws the reality off balance. Language in this light might be understood as a certain vision of reality, a horizon of understanding which is ultimately violently imposed and exclusive of the Other. And it was Heidegger himself more than anyone else who isolated this violent aspect of language when he referred to *the essence of language*, in the sense that language establishes relations, founding a certain horizon of meaning. Or if we are to supplement Heidegger’s view with Jacques Lacan’s for instance, we may note how Lacan proposes variations on Heidegger’s motive of language as “the house of Being.” For Lacan, language is *a torture-house of Being* since in the light of the Freudian experience, man is a subject caught in and tortured by language. In the same vein, as we observed, Žižek thinks that, although being coexists with language, language is not a peaceful dwelling of being as Heidegger claimed, instead the reverse is true, that is, language violently compels being to engage in a dialogue with it, and it is through this struggle that being experiences suffering and anxiety, but as this is another subject we will not have time to expound on it further. Žižek, S. (2008): “Language, Violence and Non-Violence” In: *International Journal of Žižek Studies*. Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 1–12.

¹⁹ Heidegger, M. (1971): *On the Way to Language*. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc, pp. 123–4.

²⁰ Regarding Heidegger’s description of the *originary language* in terms of *the essence of language*, Mark Wrathall remarks that Heidegger does not use the word *Wesen* (essence) in the normal way, instead he turns it into a verb: “For Heidegger, “to essence”, means ‘to bring something into its essence’, where the essence of a thing is what matters to us about it. The essence determines how one appropriately relates to it and the things concerned with it: It essences means: it comes to presence, it matters to us enduringly, moves or makes a way for us and concerns us. The essence thought in this manner names that which endures, matters to us in everything because it moves and makes a way for everything. (Unterwegs zur Sprache, p.190) Obviously, Heidegger is using the term ‘essence’ in a way unfamiliar to the philosophical tradition. In this tradition, the essence of a thing is the essential property that makes the thing what it is, or the concept by which we grasp what it is. For Heidegger, the essence of a thing is whatever leads us to recognize an essential property or concept as essential.” Wrathall, M. (2005): *How to Read Heidegger*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, p. 91–2.

Heidegger names it) is there before human speech. Language says by showing us (directing us) what we should say. It is a “showing of saying which sets all present beings free into their given presence, and brings what is absent into their absence.”(Heidegger, 1971: 126)Saying therefore means to bring into appearance. Our saying it means helping it appear the way it is, for that which appears comes up itself. Insofar as language shows us something (points something out to us) it speaks itself out to us. It speaks, because it shows what is present, and lets what is present manifest itself. In this way, Being itself shows itself in language. Kockelmans remarks:

[t]hrough language man is put into the service of Being, the total meaningfulness which shows itself in language, *and* man becomes interwoven with things within a world in a unique way...It is man’s task, within the language which is spoken to him, to gather together and to keep together in the proper way all these dimensions and regions. Only in this way can man “safeguard” his language, pursue unrestricted total meaningfulness, and, in so doing, reach his destination as man.²¹

We can speak only insofar as we stand in the openness of Being and hear the articulated words of Being. Man is *thrown* into the voiceless words of Being (logos), the articulated language of Being. By standing within the logos (standing-in-the-world), man projects and establishes his living language. According to Vincent Vycinas, “such projection is a response to the voiceless accosting of Being. *Legein* makes *logos logos*, which means that human sayings are applied and needed for the *logos* of Being just as a traveler is needed for a road to be a road.” (Vycinas, 1969: 87)

Also crucial to Heidegger’s development of these themes, are his interpretations of the poetry of Trakl, Rilke, and Hölderlin. When discussing Hölderlin, Heidegger does not approach his texts based on the significance that the poems have had in Hölderlin’s time, but interpretation, as Heidegger suggests in reference to Aristotle, should always be situated within the living present. Why situated within the living present? Because poets contain space without being contained by it, time passes but poets still remain here; they always speak in the present, or to put it in the words of T.S. Eliot: “Time past and time future/ What might have been and what has been/ Point to one end, which is always present.”(Eliot, 1943: 20)

Heidegger thinks that Hölderlin has not been chosen because his work, one among many, realizes the universal essence of poetry, but solely because Hölderlin’s poetry was borne by the poetic vocation to write expressly of the essence of poetry. (Gosetti-Ferencei, 2004: 64) Heidegger’s reading of Hölderlin’s poetry is not aesthetic, but ontological, that is to say, it is marked by the question of the meaning

²¹ Kockelmans, J. (1972): *On Heidegger and Language*. Northwestern University Press, pp. 29, 32.

of Being: *his poetry conceals and reveals Being*. In discussing Hölderlin's poem *Der Rhein*, for instance, Heidegger writes: "The only authentic task for poetry is here said to be the unveiling of the mystery of what has purely sprung forth. The mystery here is the mystery of Being understood as *Seyn*. *Being* for Hölderlin cannot be known, yet it is that by way of which knowledge is made possible. Timothy Clark comments: "We should no longer be thinking of a poem as something we can know as being 'about' something, but as opening a space of its own projection for us to inhabit, possessing us like a dance or a walk to music." (Clark, 2011, 119) In *Being and Time* (section 34), Heidegger had already maintained that the *poetic speech* (discourse) amounts to a *disclosing of existence*: "the disclosing of existence can become the true aim of *poetic speech*." Poiesis can bring forth and set up our relation to the things in the world. By bringing the world into words, poiesis makes explicit the affective horizon of world. In his other writings (as in *Introduction to Metaphysics*, for instance), Heidegger links *unconcealedness* with the poet's endeavors as well as with the poetic creations of the natural world. *Poiesis* is an *Ursprung*, or *a creation of the world in a primordial event of language*. In Georg Trakl's poem *A Winter Evening* (Heidegger, 1971: 192–3), we are brought to experience *the abiding being of language*. Through this poem, Heidegger explicates his own view on the relationship between Being and language. "The speaking speaks by bidding things to come to world, and world to things." (ibid.: 199). Language itself is *in the essential sense* (ibid.: 72), it is essentially a *namings*. By naming *that which is*, language brings forth both world and things, it helps them appear as they are. Thus, language as such, is a letting-appear, a showing.

Poiesis is thus a response of man to the language of Being. A poet takes his norm from Being to measure out the dimensions for man's dwelling, hence poiesis is to be understood as the "proper measuring of the dimension for the dwelling of human being." To dwell primarily meant to be, to make, to erect, to cultivate. By making, building or cultivating things, the maker or builder lets the worldly realities (the fourfold) come forward into a thing. Poiesis, as the foremost building, brings man to the fourfold, it brings him to dwelling. Poiesis and dwelling are interwoven. Poiesis, as the unveiling of the essence of things in the world is analogous to the craft of thinking which also is a response to the logos of Being. "Thinking poetizes the truth of Being," writes Heidegger, arguing that both thinking and poiesis are rooted in logos (=as the ground on which we dwell), and as such stand in the service of *physis*. According to Vycinas, "*Logos* as the demand of the *logos* of *physis* is brought to man by the gods in their divine *logos* and given to him with the hints of responses; and these responses are: the human language and thoughts, man's works in history, and his dwelling by sparing things. When thus responded to by man, *logos* is *logos*. There is no *logos* in itself. To *logos* necessarily belongs language, dwelling, and history of man." (Vycinas, 1969: 278–9)

Heidegger's essay *The Origin of the Work of Art* (1935–36) marks a key transition in his thinking. The text is motivated by the same question of Being that motivat-

ed *Being and Time*. In the addendum to the essay added in 1956, Heidegger makes it clear that “[t]he whole essay deliberately yet tacitly moves on the path of the question of the nature of Being. Reflection on what *art* may be is completely and decidedly determined only in regard to the question of *Being*.” (Heidegger, 1971: 85) In this sense, his reflections on art or the *poietic* (i.e. artistic creation) as opposed to that of *techne* (craftwork) are reflections on *the poietic of being*.²²

According to the title of the essay its subject is the origin of the work of art. The word *origin* means something like a cause (i.e. that which renders it possible for a thing to rise up into the open, as what it is and how it is), hence the origin of the work of art would be the artist who creates the work. But if the artist is the origin of the work of art then the work of art is also the origin of the artist, because an artist is such only by virtue of the art work that he produces. As Heidegger points out, “in themselves and in their interrelations artist and work *are* each of them by virtue of a third thing which is prior to both, namely that which also gives artist and work of art their names – art.” (Heidegger, 1971: 17) Art is therefore the origin of both the artist and the work, since it determines both the artist and the work in their being, i.e. both rise up from a source that is art itself. All true art, is for Heidegger, *in the highest sense* an ‘opening up’ of the artist to origins. Art is never merely *made*; it is brought forth and gathered from out of the emerging. (Capobianco, 2014: 93)

The fundamental question that *The Origin* seeks to answer, as the essay proceeds, is ‘What is a work of art?’ For Heidegger it is the artwork itself that is central, and not its creator (Nietzsche’s approach) or the receiver (Kant’s approach). Heidegger does not approach art in terms of aesthetic experience, because for him conventional aesthetics did not work anymore. (Harries, 2009: 2). Heidegger (following Hegel) asserts that art is the *happening of truth*. Art is one of the ways in which truth happens. He links art with the question of Being which lies on the relation between art and truth; truth understood not as correspondence, but as *unconcealedness*, as the revelation of the being of what is:

Truth is the unconcealedness of that which is as something that is. Truth is the truth of being. Beauty does not occur alongside and apart from this truth. When truth sets itself into the work, it appears. Appearance – as this being of truth in the work and as work – is beauty. Thus the beautiful belongs to the advent of truth, truth’s taking of its place. (Heidegger, 1971, 79)

But let us first consider what is established in a work of art as such, i.e. what is the thingly character of the work of art as a thing, as distinct from any other *thing*. Is a thing to be understood merely as a fusion of matter and form, a unity of man-

²² Mark Sinclair maintains: “In fact, the *Wesen* or the coming-to-presence of beings is more original than both the traditional concepts of essence and existence as determinations of the being of beings; and as Heidegger writes in the *Contributions to Philosophy*, ‘the basic principle’ of another beginning of thought, of a post-metaphysical and even post-philosophical thinking, is ‘all *Wesen* is *Wesung* [G65 66/46], that all essence is an ‘essencing’ or presencing. Sinclair, M. (2006): *Heidegger, Aristotle and the Work of Art: Poiesis in Being*. New York: Springer, p.167.

ifold properties, or merely a composition of substance? But none of these explanations can tell us what a thing really is, since there is always more in our perceiving of the phenomenon. Perhaps the proper way to grasp what a work of art is would be to distinguish it from an artifact. Thus, the first example that is given in Heidegger's essay is van Gogh's well-known painting, *A Pair of Shoes*. Although the painting shows only a pair of worn-out shoes (as artifact) on an abstract background, it reveals a great deal more to us. The painting is not concerned merely with the correctly portraying of a particular thing like a peasant woman's pair of shoes (as Heidegger infers that they belong to), but with disclosing *a revelation of the equipmental being of the shoes*, as he puts it. The shoes are grounded in a more fundamental structure which makes possible their adaptability to human service. Making manifest an entity, the artwork can help us to uncover entities as a whole: the painting reveals the whole mode of being, or in other words, through the painting the being becomes accessible in its essential nature. From this picture we learn something from the life and *world* of the peasant woman herself: her work, her hard life as a laborer, etc. This 'reliability' enables the farmer to unconceal the *world*. As a happening of truth the artwork lets beings disclose themselves in their essence. A work of art helps us comprehend the character of a *world*. Nevertheless, the shoes do not reveal only the *world* of the peasant woman: they also show *that* world as sprung forth from the *earth*. The earth is protected in the *world* of the peasant woman. Such a unity of *earth* and *world* comes about only by way of *strife* between the two:

The setting up of a world and the setting forth of earth are two essential features in the work-being of the work. They belong together, however, in the unity of work-being. This is the unity we seek when we ponder the self-subsistence of the work and try to express in words, this closed unitary repose of self-support. (ibid.: 48)

The *world*, for Heidegger, is not an object, but a unified whole, "a clearing of the paths of the essential guiding directions with which all decision complies." (ibid.: 180) Likewise, the *earth* is not to be understood in the scientific sense of our planet, but rather as matter or *substance* out of which the work of art is formed: "The earth is that whither the rising up (Aufgehen) of all that rises up is brought back into the shelter, and indeed sheltered as something rising up" (ibid.:168). The correlation between *earth* and *world* in Heidegger's use seems to be the unity of form and content, yet the text is far more difficult than it may seem to be. This is how William Richardson extrapolates the correlation referring to Heidegger's text: "There-being's finite project was conceived as a laying claim to the entire expanse of the World; that this project is always thrown among beings which captivate it and which constitute the matter-of-fact situation in which There-being finds itself. The project implies positivity, the constriction negativity. Now we find a clear analogy to this correlation of positivity and negativity in There-being when in terms of a

work of art the author speaks of the correlation between World and earth.” (Richardson, 2003: 406)

The strife between *earth* and *world* takes the form of a *rift* (Riss) which is to become the site of this strife. According to Hofstadter and Kuhns, the *Riss* (translated into English as *rift-design*), “is the opposition between material and content, and at the same time the design by which the content is actualized in the material. It is therefore the artistic figure or setting, the *Gestalt*.”²³ Every world needs earth to give it shape and form. To illustrate this idea, we should focus on Heidegger’s next analysis, that of the Greek temple:

A building, a Greek temple, portrays nothing. It simply stands there in the middle of the rock-cleft valley. The building encloses the figure of the god, and in this concealment lets it stand out into the holy precinct through the open portico. By means of the temple, the god is present in the temple. This presence of the god is in itself the extension and delimitation of the precinct as a holy precinct. The temple and its precinct, however, do not fade away into the indefinite. It is the temple-work that first fits together and at the same time gathers around itself the unity of those paths and relations in which birth and death, disaster and blessing, victory and disgrace, endurance and decline acquire the shape of destiny for the human being. (40–1)

For Heidegger, an architectural work for the Greek existence meant much more than an object that would have a beautiful form or an aesthetic finality. The temple conceives the presence of gods and gathers together the Greek *world*. The temple as a great work of art, establishes a *world* by letting the god(s) be present. Through “the unity of all those paths and relations” is constituted the world of this historical people. The temple sets up the Greek *world*, it reveals to them their *world* or culture. Standing erected there, the temple does not bring to light only the Greek *world*, but also the grounded place or site on which it stands, that is, the *earth* or *physis* as the Greeks called it. We have already mentioned that the artwork consists in this strife between *earth* and *world*, but let us return and see a more detailed account of these two. Heidegger writes:

The world worlds, and is more fully in being than the tangible and perceptible realm in which we believe ourselves to be at home. World is never an object that stands before us and can be seen. World is the ever-nonobjective to which we are subject as long as the paths of birth and death, blessing and curse keep us transported into Being. Wherever those decisions of our history that relate to our very being are made, are taken up and abandoned by us, go unrecognized and are re-discovered by new inquiry, there the world worlds. (43)

²³ Hofstadter, A. & Kuhns, R. (Eds.) (1964): *Philosophies of Art & Beauty: Selected Readings in Aesthetics from Plato to Heidegger*. The University of Chicago Press, p.648.

The world worlds (Die Welt weltet)²⁴, writes Heidegger, using *world* in a verbal form. The above argument can be interpreted (probably) thus: the worlding of the world (as the totality of all beings) that is given to the being-in-the-world (that we are), arranges and preserves and relates all the entities in different historical worlds through the manner in which those entities become accessible to men. Whereas, according to Kockelmans, such a verbal thinking of the world means that “the world ‘does what as world it is supposed to do.’ (*die Welt weltet*), the world governs and holds sway (*welten-walten*), and as such it is more fully in being than the realm of tangible things in which we believe ourselves to be at home.” (Kockelmans, 1986: 146–7) However, it is not only the world that worlds, but also the work that works. The work of art, in other words, sets up a world. It opens up a world since it consists in the happening of openness. As Heidegger puts it: “The work holds open the Open of the world.”

By setting up a *world*, the work sets forth the *earth*. The *earth* is preserved as such in the work of art. Tending to draw the *world* into itself, the *earth* is wrested into the *clearing*. Thus, we arrive at the sentence: “The setting up of a world and the setting forth of earth are two essential features in the work-being of the work.” (Heidegger, 1971: 48) This conflict or opposition in the strife between *world* and *earth* is not to be seen as destruction, but as constitutive for the Being of beings. “The opponents,” writes Kockelmans, “rather raise each other up into the self-assertion of their true modes of Being.” (Kockelmans, 1986: 155). This element of conflict is present in the same way in all arts.

We arrive at the assertion that in art the truth of what is, is set into a work. What is truth that it can happen as art? As we have already seen, *truth* is not understood here as correspondence or the conformity of knowledge with fact, but as *aletheia* (as unconcealedness of beings). According to Walter Biemel, “setting-into-work is thought of in a twofold sense: as the establishing of truth itself in the figure, in the sense of bringing forth of unconcealedness; and as the preserving of the truth that happens in the work.” (Biemel, 1976: 111) Poiesis, Heidegger asserts, is the saying of the unconcealedness of what is (Heidegger, 1971: 71). Thus we arrive at the key definition of art: “All art, as the letting happen of the advent of the truth of what is,

²⁴ Joseph J. Kockelmans observes: “Heidegger has explicitly dealt with the problem of “world” on different occasions. The first systematic treatment of the subject that was to appear in print can be found in *Being and Time*. In that work Heidegger distinguished four different meanings which the word “world” can assume: 1) the totality of all beings which are found in the universe; 2) the Being of the world taken as the totality of all beings, i.e., the totality of all meaning; 3) that wherein *Dasein* concretely lives, someone’s personal “environment”; and 4) the worldhood taken as the structural moment of *Dasein* which is as Being-in-the-world. In *Being and Time* Heidegger was not concerned with the first meaning, the ontic meaning of world; he was not interested in the third one, the pre-ontological-existential meaning either. Instead he focused mainly on the fourth, the ontologico-existential meaning, but in passing he also made very important remarks about the second, the ontological meaning of the word...The ontological meaning of the term is explained most clearly in *The Essence of Reasons*, where Heidegger makes an explicit effort to compare this meaning of the term with other meanings we often attribute to the word, and which we often tend to confuse with its ontological meaning.” Kockelmans, J., J. (1985): *Heidegger on Art and Art Works*. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, p.146.

is, as such, *essentially poetry*.” (ibid.: 72) A work of art is essentially poetry in a broad sense, because establishing-truth-to-work is essentially the process by which language originates. Heidegger does not try to reduce all art into poetry, yet poetry (poiesis) is privileged among the other arts (say painting and architecture), because of the use of language as its medium. Human being is linguistic in essence:

Language, by naming beings for the first time, first brings beings to word and to appearance. Only this naming nominates beings *to* their being *from out of* their being. Such saying is a projecting of the clearing, in which announcement is made of what it is that beings come into the Open *as*. Projecting is the release of a throw by which unconcealedness submits and infuses itself into what is as such. This projective announcement forthwith becomes a renunciation of all the dim confusion in which what is veils and withdraws itself. (ibid.: 71)

From what has just been discussed, we examine that the essence of all art is poetry (poiesis), and since the realm of poetry is language, then the essence of poetry may be understood only if we grasp the essence of language, where language is understood as *the originating naming of the essence of things*. In its source, language consists in naming beings, therefore language as naming originates Being (truth) by unveiling the Being of beings. The originating of Being is to be understood here as grounding, insofar as Dasein, by naming things in their Being, enlightens the ground wherein Being is bestowed. In this way, world and earth are unconcealed: the *world* that influences by way of Dasein’s relation to the *unconcealment of Being*, and the *earth* that hides the *world* and conceals it in beings. The dynamic strife between *world* and *earth* is thus made stable in the form of a work of art. Being sets itself to work, or establishes itself in the work. In order that Being become truth, it has to set itself in the beings towards which it is drawn and through which it must emerge in order to be itself. Human beings exist as *thrown* into the world, joined together by a shared language. Thus, we return to Heidegger’s often reiterated claim: “Language is the house of *Being*; in its home human beings dwell.” And only by dwelling poetically in the house of Being (dwelling in the essence of things) will one be able to properly preserve the strife between *world* and *earth*. Yet it is important to note here that the Da of Sein does not refer simply to the concrete human being. This openness of the *there* insofar as it establishes itself in the artwork, is a merging of the gift of Being, the creative activity and the conserving of the truth that is at work. The creator produces the work by bringing it out of the concealment (the material he uses) into non-concealment (the openness of truth); the gift of Being gives the creator a direction towards which he yields to, whereas the conserver responds to the art work as the coming-to-pass of truth. According to William J. Richardson, both creator and preserver of art render themselves (though in different ways) docile to Being, open unto it, free for its exigencies in the work of art. As Richardson further puts it: “We interpret this to mean that authentic freedom unto Being in both creator and conserver of art gathers (therefore logos) its

(negated) luminousness into single focus, receptively concentrates (noein), therefore stabilizes, its light in the tranquil, throbbing unity that *is* a work of art.” (Richardson, 2003:414)

In the Epilogue, Heidegger states that all these reflections on art “are concerned with the riddle that art itself is. They are far from claiming to solve the riddle, (for) the task is to see the riddle.” (Heidegger, 1971: 77) The riddle that art itself is, cannot give rise to definitive solutions; nevertheless it gives us the prospect of further thought. In the very long run, what is understood will always remain a riddle, for it is not clear how art in our time *abides* among us. By way of conclusion, it might be claimed that Heidegger’s philosophy of art can also serve as a link to come back to Husserl. For it was Husserl who carefully noticed the close relation between the phenomenological and the artistic: both illustrating a universally possible modification of consciousness. In this respect, Husserl distinguished the neutralizing modification of art from the neutralizing modification of image-consciousness representation. A work of art institutes a possible world that is not real but which may be so, on the grounds that in the experiencing of an artwork the transcendental consciousness is free to create its own *world*, and by so doing, the work of art may constitute an awareness of existence on the whole. Subsequently, the realm of Heidegger’s thought begins not with man’s immanent or subjective *logos* of his consciousness, but with the openness into the truth of Being (transcendental *logos*). According to Heidegger, the meaning of things in the world is rooted in Being, which is always manbound. In this way, Being orderly establishes and articulates all things in man’s world. Yet, events and things are not located in human consciousness but in the world, that is, in *the Event of Being*. The openness of being (*logos*) enables man to discover, unveil, disclose or bring into light the hidden grounds of *physis* (Nature, Reality). To conclude, it was Husserl who made way for the space within which Heidegger proposed that the work of art is the *ground* where truth appears, emphasizing the truth rather than the appearance itself. Yet, it seems that Heidegger’s conception of art as *the setting-of-truth-into-work* in our current age of technology has become largely partialized, for we are living in this world where *simulacrum is equal to that of nature*²⁵, or in other words, where the image or representation of the world has become for us the so-called real world.

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²⁵ Baudrillard, J. (1994): *Simulacra and Simulation*. The University of Michigan Press, p.153.

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